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Introduction
Through generous financial support, Germany has dramatically increased the electricity production from renewable technologies since the outset of this century (IEA 2007:65) . With an estimated share of about 14 % of total electricity production in 2007, Germany has already significantly exceeded its target of at least 12.5% set for 2010.
Currently, wind power is the most important renewable energy technology: In 2007, the estimated share of wind power in Germany's electricity production amounted to 7.4% (BWE 2008) . In contrast, the electricity produced through solar photovoltaic (PV) was almost negligible: Its share is gauged to be 0.4%.
Without a doubt, the substantial contribution of renewable energy technologies to Germany's electricity production is primarily a consequence of the feed-in tariff regime established in 2000. Under this regime, which is based on the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), utilities are obliged to accept the delivery of power from independent producers of renewable electricity into their own grid, thereby paying technologyspecific feed-in tariffs far above own production cost. The support stipulated by the EEG is indispensable for increasing the significance of "green electricity", since in terms of cost, renewable energy technologies can hardly compete with the conventional electricity production. Ultimately, though, it is the industrial and private consumers that have to bear the cost induced by the EEG -through an increase in the price of electricity. Wind power has so far exerted the strongest effect on electricity prices. This is a consequence of very high subsidies (MICHAELOWA 2005:192) , which accounted for several billion euros or about half of the overall feed-in tariffs in 2007. Solar electricity, however, is guaranteed by far the largest financial support per kilowatt hour (kWh). This is necessary for establishing a market foothold, with the still poor technical efficiencies of PV modules and the unfavorable geographical location of Germany being among a multitude of reasons for its grave lack of competitiveness.
According to their proponents, the subsidies for PV, as well as for other renewable energy technologies, are frequently justified by highlighting their positive impact on energy security and employment, and, most notably, by emphasizing their role as vital environmental and climate protection measures.
In this article, we argue that Germany's way of supporting PV in fact does not confer any of these benefits. First, as a consequence of the coexistence of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the increased use of renewable energy technologies triggered by the EEG does not imply any additional emission reductions beyond those already achieved by ETS alone. Similarly disappointing is, second, the net employment balance, which is likely to be negative due to the very high opportunity cost of supporting PV.
Third, we argue that the subsidized market penetration of non-competitive technologies in their early stages of development diminishes the incentives to invest in the research and development necessary to achieve competitiveness. This argument seems to be particularly relevant for solar cells, whose technological efficiency is widely known to be modest. As this article demonstrates, it is all the more disconcerting that the large feed-in tariffs per kWh currently granted for PV constitute a subsidization regime that reaches a per-employee level comparable to that of German hard coal pro- The following section describes the EEG's preferential treatment of PV. Section 3 presents cost estimates of subsidizing this particular renewable energy technology for two scenarios: first, if Germany's current renewable energy subsidization scheme had been abolished at the end of 2007 and, second, if it were to end with the year 2010. In Section 4, we assess the potential benefits of this support scheme for the global climate and the employment in Germany, which may justify the PV subsidization. The last section summarizes and concludes. 5 2 The Sunrise of PV Certainly, the major reason for the boom of renewable technologies for electricity production in Germany is the feed-in tariff scheme, which is based on the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) enacted in April 2000. Since then, the share of renewable energy in total electricity production has increased from about 3% to roughly 14% in 2007, while the annual amount of feed-in tariffs increased sixfold and reached a level that is twice as high as the subsidies for German hard coal production, a long-lasting and notorious example of Germany's misguided state aid policy (FRONDEL, KAMBECK, SCHMIDT 2007:3814) . To neutralize its grave lack of competitiveness, solar electricity production received the highest support per kWh among all renewable energy technologies, being in stark contrast to any efficiency criteria.
With the amendment of the EEG in August 2004, the compensation granted for solar electricity was even raised, thereby immediately initiating a tremendous increase in the number of installed solar systems (Table 1 ). This figure more than doubled within one year, from 84,870 in 2004 84,870 in to 172,810 in 2005 84,870 in (Kiesel 2006 , again rising substantially in 2006, to 233,557 (Kiesel 2007:47) . The evident reason for this particularly pronounced growth is the attractive compensation, which is -as already stipulated in the original EEG version -granted for as long as two decades at the unvaried level valid for the year of installation (IEA 2007:68-69) . For PV modules installed in 2006, for instance, the amended EEG granted 51.8 cents per kWh solar electricity, a remuneration that was almost ten times higher than the market price of conventionally produced electricity.
While this compensation was six times the tariff granted for wind power (8.5 cents per kWh), the average feed-in tariff for electricity from renewable energy technologies was Table 1 ), most notably from Japan. Only recently, new producers of PV modules entered the scene, being mainly located in East Germany, and managed to largely satisfy domestic demand. In 6 addition to generous feed-in tariffs, the large demand has been fueled by a particular rule introduced with the EEG amendment in 2004: Each year, the tariff granted for the subsequent 20 years for newly installed PV modules decreases by 5%. This decrease was implemented to provide an incentive for producers to improve the economic efficiency of these renewable energy technologies. Since the largest remuneration is paid now, though, the most important result of this modification is a strong incentive for a soon installation of the currently available, inefficient technology. Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that we observe shortages in high-quality silicon used for the production of solar cells. At first glance, it seems to be surprising that such a massive subsidization of a highly inefficient way of electricity production does not create a hot public and political debate. One reason is that renewable energy technologies are frequently seen as a chance to reinvigorate regions suffering from industrial decline, thereby mobilizing a coalition of local politicians, farmers, and trade unions (MICHAELOWA 2005:198) . This holds particularly true for regions in Eastern Germany, where recently several solar PV parks have been established. Another, probably more relevant factor is that the cost are widely dispersed across the entire population (MICHAELOWA 2005:198) . In fact, although the support for renewable electricity totaled 5.61 Bn e in 2006 (VDN 2007) , the mean price effect on the 615.8 Bn kWh of gross domestic electricity consumption (Schiffer 2007:37) was a modest increase of about 0.9 cents per kWh. As average households consume some 3,500 kWh of electricity per year, this implies extra cost for "green" electricity of about 31.5 e, with about one fifth accounting for PV.
Even though the burden for individual consumers appears to be moderate, two important aspects must be taken into account. First, the private consumers' overall loss of purchasing power adds up to billions of Euro. Similarly, with the exception of the preferentially treated energy-intensive firms, the total investments of industrial energy consumers may also be substantially lower. Second, the EEG will have long- Table   1 ), whereas NITSCH et al. (2005) only expected 0.84 Bn kWh. If the current promotion conditions are not changed, the forecasts presented in Table 2 will most likely also underestimate future PV electricity production. In this case, our cost estimates might be too conservative, even though the "high price scenario" assumed by NITSCH et al.
(2005) seems to be rather moderate from the current perspective: real base-load prices are expected to rise from 4.91 cents per kWh in 2010 to 6.34 cents per kWh in 2020 (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
Total feed-in tariffs for each cohort of newly installed PV modules are displayed at in the last column of Of course, in addition to the product of the volume of solar electricity and feedin tariffs, any assessment of net cost must also take account of the electricity's market value. Using past market prices and the "high price scenario" assumed by NITSCH et 1 Further benefits and cost are ignored, such as the cost for regulating energy required due to the volatility of electricity produced by solar and wind power, since these cost are almost negligible compared to electricity prices and, in particular, feed-in tariffs. External cost are included to a certain extent, though, because market prices of electricity entail the prices of carbon dioxide emission certificates.
9 Column 3: Product of Column 1 and 2. Column 4: Column 3 times 20.
Column 5: Inflation-corrected figures of Column 4 using a rate of 2%.
al. (2005), we thus calculate the real net cost induced by supporting PV as the difference between feed-in tariffs per kWh and market prices -see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for our detailed calculations. Yet, because feed-in tariffs are much larger than electricity prices, the net cost do not differ substantially from the tariffs. For example, the cumulated real support of some 8.3 Bn e, reported in Table 2 for those modules that were installed in 2006, are quite close to the real net cost of about 7.2 Bn e (Table   3) . Altogether, the real net cost for all modules that have been installed since the EEG went into force in 2000 account for about 21.8 Bn e (Table 3) . Future PV installations between 2008 and 2010 may cause further real cost, cumulating to about 8 Bn e.
All these cost estimates demonstrate clearly that producing electricity on the basis of PV is among the most expensive greenhouse gas abatement options. Irrespective of the concrete assumption about the fuel base of the displaced conventionally produced electricity, abatement cost estimates are dramatically larger than current prices of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emission certificates. Since the establishment of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 2005, these certificates have never been more expensive Column 5: Last row of Table A2 in the Appendix.
than 30 e per tonne of CO 2 . Assuming, for instance, that PV displaces conventional electricity generated from a mixture of gas and hard coal and, hence, basing our calculation on an emission factor of 0.584 kg CO 2 /kWh, abatement costs are as high as 760 e per tonne if we refer to 44.5 cents/kWh, the additional cost of 2007 (Table 3 ).
The magnitude of these abatement cost is in accordance with the IEA's (2007:74) even larger estimate of around 1,000 e per tonne, where it is assumed that PV replaces gasfired electricity generation. After all, from an environmental perspective, it would be economically much more efficient if greenhouse gas emissions were to be curbed via the ETS, rather than subsidizing PV. For efficiency reasons, emissions trading is among the most preferred policy instruments for the abatement of greenhouse gases in the economic literature (BÖHRINGER, LÖSCHEL 2002) .
Impacts of Germany's PV Promotion
Given the substantial cost associated with the promotion of PV, one would expect sig- Table 1 ), domestic production only provided for 32% of the new capacity installed in Germany.
Hence, any other result than a disappointing net employment balance of the German PV promotion would be surprising, whereas we would expect massive employment effects in export countries such as Japan, since these countries neither suffer from the EEG's crowding-out nor negative income effects.
In the end, the promotion of PV has become a subsidization regime that, on a per-capita basis, has by far exceeded the level of the German hard coal production, one of the most prominent examples of misguided government intervention in Germany:
Given our net cost estimate of about 7.2 Bn e for 2006 reported in Table 3 , per-capita capita subsidies turn out to be as high as 205,000 e, if indeed 35,000 people were employed in the PV sector (BSW 2007) . By comparison, with roughly the same number of employees and hard coal subsidies of 2.5 Bn e, each job in the German hard coal sector was subsidized by an already outrageous 70,000 e in 2006 (FRONDEL, KAMBECK, SCHMIDT 2007:3807) .
In line with an energy policy that seems prepared to wholly disregard any consideration of cost, the major reason for the particularly large subsidies granted for PV is that technological efficiencies of solar cells are far below their theoretical potential (NEIJ 1997 (NEIJ :1102 . Although their efficiency has increased considerably over the years, this fact would quite obviously suggest that one should currently abstain from subsidizing market penetration. Rather, from an economic perspective, one should intensify research and development (R & D) . Substantially improving technological efficiencies would by far be the better energy policy for Germany. Given the widely known low technological efficiencies of about 20% for crystalline-silicon cells and 10% for amorphous-silicon cells (NEIJ 1997 (NEIJ :1102 , funding R & D appears indeed to be a promising avenue to achieve substantial cost and, hence, price reductions.
In Germany, prices have remained quite high, though, despite the significant cost reductions that arise from economies of scale and learning effects. The reason for this fact is that the attractive incentives provided by the EEG have led the demand for PV modules to outrun domestic supply. In fact, according to recent studies on experience and learning effects in PV production in Japan (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and the U. S. (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , the cost of producing PV modules tends to shrink by more than 20 % with each doubling of production (NEIJ 1997 (NEIJ :1102 . Using more recent PV data for Germany, Switzerland, and the U. S. (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , PAPINEAU (2006:426) finds cost reductions in the range of 3 to 17%, with those for Germany lying between 12% and 15%. Given the tremendous growth in recent PV installations in Germany (see Table 1 ), annual cost reductions should also be of this order of magnitude. Thus, the current decrease in feed-in tariffs of 5% per year seems inappropriately low. Consequently, any further amendment of the EEG should incorporate much larger than the prevailing decreases in tariffs. This would set strong cost-oriented incentives and save societal resources. Ultimately, rather than generously remunerating the production of solar electricity, public funding of solar cell R & D should be increased. Germany's PV support has created many jobs abroad, since a significant share of PV modules has had to be imported, most notably from Japan and China.
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Summary and Conclusion
In its country report on Germany's energy policy, the International Energy Agency even recommends considering "policies other than the very high feed-in tariffs to promote solar photovoltaics" (IEA 2007:77) , since "the government should always keep cost-effectiveness as a critical component when deciding between policies and measures" (IEA 2007:76) . Instead, in line with our arguments, the IEA proposes policy instruments that favor research and development. Yet, so far Germany's support scheme of renewable energy technologies, in particular of PV, resembles traditional active labor market programs, which have been demonstrated in the literature to be counterpro-ductive (KLUVE 2006:13) . The long dark shadows of this support will last for another two decades even if the EEG were to be abolished immediately. From a social welfare perspective, we therefore recommend the rapid reduction of these subsidies, taking account of recent estimates of annual reductions in production cost, which are on the order of 12% to 15%. The net cost shown in Table A2 are calculated by subtracting actual or expected market prices of electricity from feed-in tariffs. While these are fixed for each cohort of installed solar modules for a period of 20 years, market prices of course tend to change over time. Therefore, the net cost per kWh displayed in the columns vary accordingly.
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Appendix
The cumulative net cost induced by an individual cohort, reported in the last row, results from adding up the products of the real net cost per kWh and the solar electricity produced by each cohort displayed in the penultimate row.
